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Comments and Casenotes
LIABILITY OF LESSORS OF SAFE
DEPOSIT BOXES
Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott'
In a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County
the plaintiff-appellee obtained a judgment for loss of property placed in a safe deposit box which he had leased from
the defendant bank. The judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.2
The box was leased and fifty $1,000 gold certificates,
together with other property, were placed therein several
years after the issuance of a Federal Executive Order
which prohibited the retention of gold certificates except
under license.3 The plaintiff alleged that he was not aware
of the Executive Order and, therefore, did not know that
the certificates should have been turned into the Treasury
in exchange for other money. He testified that he last
saw the safe deposit box on November 30, 1937, at which
time he removed $200 therefrom and checked to make certain that the envelope containing the gold certificates was
still there. On December 13, 1937, the plaintiff visited the
Morris Plan Bank and inquired concerning the possibility
219
A. (2d) 169 (Md., 1941).
2
The bank filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a petition for
certiorari to review the action of the Maryland Court. This petition was
denied. The plaintiff executed on his judgment and it was returned nulla
bona, as the bank was insolvent. Plaintiff then instituted, on the
judgment, an attachment suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
against Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., as garnishee. The Insurance
Company removed the case to the Federal District Court for Maryland.
This company had issued a safe depository liability policy to the bank and
the plaintiff contended that, as beneficiary of this policy, he had a right
to recover the amount of his judgment. His claim was based both on the
express terms of the policy and on Md. Code (1939) Art. 48A, See. 68,
which provides that if an execution upon any final judgment against the
assured, under a liability insurance policy issued in the State of Maryland,
is returned unsatisfied an action may be brought by or on behalf of the
injured person against the insurance company. Plaintiff's motion for
judgment was granted, Abbott v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 42 Fed.
Supp. 793 (D. C. Md., 1942). This was affirmed by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Abbott, 130
Fed. Rep. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
3 "After 30 days from the date of this order no person shall hold in his
possession or retain any interest, legal or equitable, in any gold coin, gold
bullion, or gold certificates situated in the United States and owned by any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except under license
therefor issued pursuant to this Executive order . . ."-Executive Order
6260, Sec. 5, August 28, 1933, 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 95 (5).
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of disposing of a $1,000 gold certificate; upon relating that
he had fifty of them, the plaintiff was advised to engage
counsel. The attorney whom he selected suggested that
he go to the bank the next day to obtain the gold certificates and promised to take them to the Treasury for him.
The following morning while the plaintiff was signing the
register in the safe deposit box room of the defendant
bank, the attendant to whom he had just handed his key
exclaimed: "There is no box there, you must have left
it outside in one of the booths." Neither the box nor its
contents were ever accounted for in any way.
The plaintiff contended that the loss resulted from the
negligence and default of defendant in not using reasonable care and diligence in guarding and safekeeping the
safe deposit box. In addition to the general issue plea, the
defendant filed a special plea which stated that the plaintiff had no interest, legal or equitable, in the fifty gold
certificates because he held them in violation of an Act of
Congress and of an Executive Order,4 and therefore was
not entitled to maintain his action to recover the alleged
loss. The plaintiff's demurrer to the latter plea was sustained.
The Court of Appeals clearly pointed out several defects in the defendant's special plea. The only point of
substantive law involved was that a bailee cannot dispute
a bailor's title; this is in accord with the great weight of
authority. 5 Also, in discussing the plaintiff's claim to the
gold certificates, the Court implied that the certificates
likely could have been exchanged at the Treasury and,
therefore, that plaintiff had a very real interest in them.
This was based on the decision of a Federal District Court
which had held that the Government could not confiscate
gold money without proving intent on the part of the
holder to violate the act under which the Executive Order
calling in gold and gold certificates was issued.6
In passing on the lower court's ruling on the prayers,
the appellate court cited Security Storage and Trust Co. v.
IFederal Reserve Act, Section 11 (n), as added in 1933, 12 U. S. C. A.
248 (n) ; Trading with the Enemy Act, Section 5(b), as amended in 1933,
50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, Section 5.
Barker v. Lewis Storage and Transfer Co., 79 Conn. 342, 65 A. 143
(1906); Viers v. Webb, 76 Mont. 38, 245 P. 257 (1926); Ford's Adm'x. v.
Bank of Hartford, 250 Ky. 793, 63 S. W. (2d) 967 (1933) ; Kramer v.
Grand Natl. Bank of St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1022, 81 S. W. (2d) 961 (1935)
The "Idaho", 93 U. S. 575 (1876).
a United States v. 98 $20 United States Gold Coins, et al., 20 Fed. Supp.
354 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1937).
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Martin,' which embraced facts similar to those in the instant case, and reiterated the holding therein to be the law
of Maryland. In that case the Court held that the relationship of the parties to a safe deposit box lease was that
of bailor and bailee, and that failure to deliver and account
for the property placed in the box should be treated as
prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the
bailee in not exercising ordinary or reasonable care and
diligence in its safe keeping. The Maryland Code, in its
provisions relative to the lessor's right to limit its liability
by contract (which will be discussed in a subsequent paragraph) refers to the party leasing a safe deposit box as
"such lessor or bailee".,
The Maryland view in calling the transaction a bailment is in accord with the views of a majority of the
courtsY Many of the text writers, on the other hand, state
that the rental of a safe deposit box is in the nature of a
lease of space, creating a landlord-tenant relationship.' 0
They point out that possession is one of the fundamental
elements of a bailment and contend that the lessor of the
box does not have sufficient custody and control of its contents to constitute possession, the property remaining in
the possession of the lessee who, alone, has access to it.
The analogy used by some of the writers taking this position compares the rental of a safe deposit box with the
leasing of office space in a large office building. Property
placed in the office is not in possession of the owner of the
1144 Md. 536, 125 A. 449 (1924).
'Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 293.
I Security Storage and Trust Co. v. Martin, 144 Md. 536, 125 A. 449
(1924); National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Il1. 584, 95 N. E. 973
(1911), affirmed 232 U. S. 58 (1914); Young v. First National Bank of
Oneida, 150 Tenn. 451, 265 S. W. 681 (1924) ; Roberts v. Stuyvesant SafeDeposit Co., 123 N. Y. 57, 9 L. R. A. 438, 25 N. E. 294 (1890); Reading
Trust Co. v. Thompson, 254 Pa. 333, 98 A. 953 (1916) ; West Cache Sugar
Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, 11 A. L. R. 216, 190 P. 946 (1920) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Diltz, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 26, 91 S. W. 596 (1906);
Trainer v. Saunders, 270 Pa. 451, 113 A. 681 (1921) ; Cummins, A Review
of the Law of Safe-Deposit Companies (1895) 9 Harv. L. Rev. 131.
10ELLioTr, BAIrMENTS (2d ed., 1929) Sec. 105; 2 SRE'r, FOUNDATIONS
orF LEGAL LIABILITY, Ch. 28, 291; VAN ZILE, BAILMENTS (2d ed.) Secs. 195,
196; HALE, BAILMENTS, 248, 249; GODDARD, BAILMENTS, Sec. 158.
One law review writer expressed the view that the relationship is that
of licensor and licensee; he states that it cannot be a landlord-tenant relationship because the tenant does not have free and unencumbered access
to the property which he has rented. Note, Bailment-Landlord and Tenant
-Licenses--Warehousemen---Relation Between Renter of Safe-Deposit Box
and the Safe-Deposit Company (1927) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 440. This view is
criticized in Note, Property: The relation of a safety deposit bow company
and its patrons (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 325, which points out that a licensorlicensee relationship would impose no duty of care on the lessor.
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building; it remains in the custody and control of the tenant
even though he may have access to it only during reasonable business hours. Another writer adds that since possession has remained in the lessee of a safe deposit box,
there has been no delivery and without such there can be
no bailment."
While disagreeing with the courts as to terminology,
some of the writers take the view that from the standpoint
of the lessor's liability for failure to safeguard and to
return property placed in the box, the technical legal relationship is merely an academic question. In the absence of
a statute, the lessor has the same duties and responsibilities
to its customers by means of their contracts, 12express or
implied, as those imposed upon a bailee for hire.
The question whether the transaction is a bailment
takes on more practical aspects when the rights of third
parties become involved. A majority of the courts have
held that a creditor of the lessee may reach the property in
the safe deposit box by garnishment proceedings.'3 This
is consistent with their contention that the transaction between the lessor and lessee is a bailment, which requires
that possession be in the former. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has not ruled on this point, however, and any
expression of opinion as to which course the Court will
follow if the question is ever presented would be mere conjecture. One of the most recent cases in point, in another
jurisdiction, adopted the minority view. 4 Since no third
party creditors ,:' involved in the instant case, this note
will be confined to the rights of the immediate parties to
the lease.
In most jurisdictions, including Maryland, the lessor of
safe deposit boxes is required to use ordinary care, or such
care as a prudent man would take of his own goods.'3 The
duty arises from the nature of the business as well as from
the legal responsibilities of a bailee for hire.' 6 Maryland
11 DotaE, BAILUENTS AND CARIERS (1914) 167.
1 ELLIOTT, BAILMENTS (2d ed., 1929) Sec. 106; HALE, BAILMENTS, 250.
is West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, supra, n. 9; Washington Loan
and Trust Co. v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 26 App. D. C. 149 (1905) ; Tillinghast v. Johnson, 34 R. I. 136, 82 A. 788, 41 L. R. A. N. S. 764 (1912) ; Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 P. 125, 54.L. R. A. 204 (1900) ; Trainer
v. Saunders, supra, n. 9.
1 Wells v. Cole, 194 Minn. 275, 260 N. W. 520 (1935).
15 Cussen v. Southern Cal. Savings Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 65 P. 1099 (1901);
Mayer v. Brensinger, 180 Ill. 110, 54 N. U. 159 (1899) ; Security Storage
and Trust Co. v. Martin, supra, n. 7; Young v. First National Bank of
Oneida, supra, n. 9.
1" ELLIOTT, BAILMENTS

(1929)

See. 105; HALE, BAILMENTS, 250.
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differs from the weight of authority, however, with respect
to the burden that is placed upon the defendant to prove
that he has exercised such care. A majority of the courts
hold that although the defendant must overcome the prima
facie case of negligence which results from the property
not being returned to the plaintiff box holder, once the defendant has met that burden by offering evidence of care,
the plaintiff must prove his allegations of negligence if he
is to recover."' Maryland, on the other hand, requires
the defendant to show, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that it has exercised the required care. s Thus, in
our state, the plaintiff need only prove that the property
which he placed in the safe deposit box was not extracted
by him or by anyone acting under his authority, has not
been returned to him, and is no longer in the box in the
lessor's safe deposit vault. The burden then shifts to the
defendant, whose success or failure to show that he has
exercised the required degree of care virtually determines
the verdict.
In the instant case the defendant bank did not explain
in any way the disappearance of the box nor or its contents;
it merely offered evidence to show the practices in its safe
deposit box room and this testimony did little to help its
case. 19 Thus, it hardly met the burden of proof placed
upon it by the prima facie evidence of negligence and it
11 Schaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co., 281 Ill. 43, 117 N. E. 781
(1917) ; Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Pacific Transfer Co., 120 Wash.
665, 208 P. 55 (1922) ; Corbin v. Gentry and Forsythe Cleaning and Dyeing
Co., 181 Mo. App. 151, 167 S. W. 1144 (1914) ; Herbert v. Patrick, 27 Colo.
App. 204, 146 P. 190 (1915).
, Security Storage and Trust Co. v. Martin, supra, n. 7.
The Clerk who testified for the defendant bank was engaged in other
phases of the bank's work primarily, but helped the regular attendant in
the safe deposit box room when the latter was especially busy and during
the lunch hour. She explained that no one could obtain access to a safe
deposit box which had been leased except by use of both a guard key and
the boxholder's key and that the former was retained by the employee in
charge, in her cage, back of the grille. (It is the usual situation that both
the guard key and the boxholder's key are required to open a safe deposit
box.) The witness stated, however, that the key to the box which contained the unused keys was available to any employee of the bank. While
this might appear, on first glance, to be a harmless practice, it has serious
possibilities in that an employee with evil intent might have the keys to
some of the boxes duplicated before the boxes are leased and later, by
obtaining the guard key, have access to the boxes.
The witness testified that on the last date on which the plaintiff claims
to have seen the lost property she assisted him in obtaining his box and
then returned to her work in another part of the bank and was not at the
door as the plaintiff left the safe deposit box room. Although the plaintiff
testified that there was an attendant at the door of the safe deposit box
room to let him out, the bank presented no evidence of this, nor of its
general practice in this regard.
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likely would have been held liable for the loss in any state
in which the situation may have arisen.
In a case like the one at bar, where the entire box is
missing, without any signs of a burglary having occurred,
the loss tends to speak for itself. It is most unusual for
such a situation to arise, and the Maryland rule, which
places a more severe burden upon the defendant, would
not appear to be unreasonable in such circumstances.
There is certainly little that the plaintiff can prove relative
to the disappearance of the box; any facts available on this
point are more likely to be known to the defendant.
Several months after the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision in Security Storage and Trust Co. v. Martin, which
announced the rule that the defendant-lessor must overcome a prima facie case of negligence in showing by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that it has exercised the
required degree of care, the Legislature came to the aid of
the banks and other depositories which lease safe deposit
boxes. A statute was passed making it possible for the
lessor to limit its liability by contract." The statute provides that loss due to negligence may be limited to any
amount not less than five hundred times the annual
rental 21 ; that the lessor may name money, jewelry, or any
other specified articles for which it will assume no liability; also, the contract may stipulate that evidence tending
to prove loss of property from the box shall not be sufficient to raise a presumption that it was lost by any negligence of the lessor, nor to place the burden of proof on the
lessor. Evidently the defendant bank in the case at bar
did not avail itself of the provisions of the statute in leasing
the box to the plaintiff.
Thus, while the decision in Security Storage and Trust
Co. v. Martin placed a hardship upon the depositories,
which likely gave them some concern, this situation was
short lived. The statute which relieved them of their
burden appears to be as liberal as could be justified, considering the nature of the business. The leasing of a safe
deposit box implies that the property to be placed therein
is small in bulk but of relatively high value; this makes it
necessary that a high degree of care be exercised by the
lessor. Possibly, under the statute, the pendulum has
10Md.

Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 293.
11Since a large majority of the boxes rent for $5.00 per year or less,
the lessor could limit its liability for negligence to $2,500 in most of its
contracts. Many companies which offer this service, however, have large
boxes, a few of which may rent for $100 per year or more.
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swung too far, the banks being allowed to contract away
so great a portion of their liability. Should cases arise in
which the statute works a hardship on the lessees, it is
likely that there will be a demand for its revision. However, at present, it would seem that a bank, or other depository, would avail itself of the liberal provisions of the
statute by inserting appropriate wording in its contracts.
EXTENT OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS
Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., Inc.'
Plaintiff bought a box of face powder and other toilet
articles from defendant department store. The set was
contained in an ornate box, decorated with two metal stars.
In opening the box, plaintiff cut her finger on one of these
stars. She brought an action against the department store,
alleging that it was liable for breach of implied warranty
of fitness. The declaration stated that plaintiff bought
the powder for toilet and beautifying purposes. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court which had sustained
defendant's demurrer, stating as reasons for doing so: (1)
that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
does not cover defects in the container in which the goods
are packed, and (2) that there is no implied warranty of
fitness as to patent defects where plaintiff has examined
the goods.
One of the changes wrought by the Uniform Sales Act
in respect to warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
was to extend the liability of the manufacturer or grower
for breach thereof to all sellers, be they growers or manufacturers or not.' A Maryland case which clearly and concisely points out this change is that of Luria Bros. & Co. v.
Klaif.3 There the plaintiff, who was the seller but not the
manufacturer, brought an action to recover the price of
several carloads of metal. Defendant buyer claimed that
he was entitled to a set-off arising out of a prior sale of steel
124

A. (2d) 783 (Md., 1942).
found in Md. Code (1939) Art. 83, See. 33: "Subject to
the provisions of this sub-title and of any statute in that behalf, there is
no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale,
except as follows: (1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
S139 Md. 586, 115 A. 849 (1921).
2 Sec. 15 (1),

